

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

UNITED STATES COORDINATOR

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS



October 22, 1962

File Cuba

Mr. Ralph A. Dungan
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Ralph:

Ted gave me the attached memorandum, written by Felipe Pazos' son in Puerto Rico, on Friday. I would not send it to you except that this subject seems to be especially current now.

While my judgment is that the memorandum is too sweeping and suggests actions which the U.S. Government could not take, it is worth quick reading. Its chief point is that if we seek to encourage certain non-Communist Cubans in Cuba to overturn Castro, the U.S. must make clear it does not seek a return to the status quo ante.

I believe it was on this basis that Ted first considered the suggestion of the President speaking over the head of the Castro government in a public message -- by TV, radio, and the written word -- to the Cuban people.

WTD

Bill

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

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BY SKP

NARS, DATE 8/24/77

**MEMORANDUM
CUBAN SITUATION**

There are only two alternatives open to the United States Government: Counter - revolution, with the policies followed up to the present; or to subvert the Cuban Regime through the anti-communists, who are still in majority both in the high and low echelons of the Regime.

It must be made very clear that for the first alternative to work the invasion of Cuba by U.S. Armed Forces is necessary, and that the casualties of both Americans and Cubans will be very high.

In Cuba a real Revolution has taken place where a more dynamic group of people have displaced from power -in the broad sense of the word used in the Social Sciences- another group riddled by contradictions, who is now mostly residing in the United States. (I refer to the ex-leaders of Cuban society, rather than to the mass of people now in exile). The sad part of this affair is that Dr. Castro has taken the Cuban Revolution into the Communist camp against the desire of the majority of revolutionaries who have nevertheless followed him because never, during the last two years, has there been an alternative course open to them -or a large group of them- whereby they (the Revolution) could retain power after overthrowing Castro and the Communists.

Since Cuba depends, to a large extent, on the outside world - the United States or Russia under present circumstances - the Revolutionaries that could overthrow Castro and the communists know that, ~~and~~ they know

with the Russians, they must be acceptable to the U.S., so as to be able to negotiate the re-establishment of commercial relations. Instead of giving the impression that anybody who maintains contacts in Cuba must count with U.S. recognition, the U.S. Government and the Cuban nation in its behalf, have created the contrary impression. There is the strong conviction among the Cuban Revolutionaries, Government officials and the persons in the lower echelons of the Regime, that any alternative to Castro means, at best their total displacement, but most likely the loss of their heads. This, in our opinion, has been the arm mostly used by Castro and the Communists to maintain the attachment to the Regime of all the anti-Communists and non-Communists, who are still a majority inside the Regime.

If an alternative acceptable to these people is adequately laid out it is, however, not too late to attempt subversion in Cuba because of the following reasons:

a) The Regime is still mainly composed by non-Communists and anti-Communists.

b) All the non-Communists, and certainly the anti-Communists, now in power know that they will probably be supplanted by people of the same convictions now undergoing communist indoctrination. With no other political alternative, which all these people could grasp, they are forced to take individual action and save themselves, when their turn comes up.

c) The nationalism exasperated by Castro against the United States and this has been an extremely important factor playing on the reactions of both the masses and the revolutionaries- can now be as effectively turned against the Russians and the Communists. In this respect, it is important

to point out that for a long time now it has been the conviction of many
leading officials and Cuban Government officials that the sole interest
of the U.S. in Cuba was to use this country as a bargaining card with
other states. That any of approaching these people is by telling them
that there is no other way out of their present situation except
voluntarily to accept the

1) The U.S. will not support the present
regime in Cuba.

2) The possibility of a liberating public opinion that is favorable
to a non-Communist solution which may seem desirable to them
to them. Finally, because it would leave the United States free to
develop its policy it would not mean the loss of the higher status which
the revolution has given them. The mobilization of public opinion on an
international scale would, of course, have tremendous influence in the House,
Senate, Militia and the Violence Committee.

Thus, because of the above mentioned factors, we think that it is
possible to induce many of the persons now with the desire to overthrow
the regime, if and when the appropriate circumstances and objectives
are created.

These circumstances and objectives consist fundamentally in
the U.S. making the possibility that any group of persons, regardless of
their size, that overthrows the Communist regime can count with the U.S.
for full recognition and economic help without further conditions.

To accomplish this we must exert constant pressure on the U.S. Government
and the U.S. Congress, the United States Government, the United States Congress
and the U.S. people that can be interpreted in that sense, that create the
impression that it would accept any internal solution against the Communists

to recognize

in Cuba. In this respect we consider of the utmost importance that the O.A.S. should pass resolutions along these lines which would provide the guarantees that international organizations always give. Secondly, a group of Cubans in exile should operate as something of a bridge with these Cubans, now with the Regime, that could precipitate an internal solution of the sort we have been speaking about.

These Cubans should form a Committee, whose explicit purpose would be that of precipitating an anti-Communist solution with internal forces that they are convinced cannot accept Communism as a way of life in Cuba. This Committee cannot be a political movement, for a political movement aspires to conquer power for its people and under the circumstances the doors should be left open to anybody who desires to conquer power for himself or a given group of persons. At the same time the Committee should operate from Latin America, far, although it is important that people know the U.S. accepts the solution the Committee stands for; the Committee must appeal to Cuban nationalism. For this to be possible, the Committee cannot appear to be a direct Agency of the U.S. Government, as is the case with El Consejo Revolucionario.

The function of this Committee at first should be exclusively that of massive propaganda directed to Cuba by long and short waves radio. This propaganda should be centered around these points:

- 1) The solution to the crisis the country is living can only come from inside. It is up to the citizens to resist Communism and up to the militiamen, rebel soldiers and rebel officers to rise against tyranny.

- 2) It is not the will of the people for things to return to what they were in 1933, but neither is it the will of the people to let Fidel,

Ries Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez give our country to the Russians. The maintenance of the status of dignity the Revolution gave to our people and the Russians are now taking away. Specifically:

- i) Land for the peasants as the Revolution originally wanted and they are doing away with now by collectivizing agriculture.
- ii) Trade Union freedom for the workers.
- iii) Opportunities of acquiring high incomes through free enterprise and self-employment.
- 3) Campaign of Civic Resistance in things that are feasible for people to do without much danger to themselves. In this way people feel that they are actively participating against the Regime, and gradually incorporate themselves to higher forms of resistance. It is our experience that people, who started timidly selling breads of the 26th of July, ended up hiding guns and fighting in the Sierra. Examples of the type of slogans we are thinking of are the following:

- i) To the farmer not to sow.
- ii) To the worker to produce as little as possible.
- iii) Whenever the Regime appeals to the citizenry on something specific, to disregard these appeals, etc.
- 4) Concentrate fire against a small group of people at the top, giving the impression everybody else is acceptable to the Committee and thus the United States.

Later on, when the internal circumstances have cleared up, and when the effect of this new policy has had time to show, the Committee can take up the job of coordinating an internal uprising or coup against the Regime. This should be on the basis of a future Government headed by persons who are still with the Revolution.

Also, since subversion in the context we are talking of here is conceived as a process, which may last some time, the most appropriate actions against the Regime -as sabotage, guerrilla warfare, etc.- which would cooperate in producing the final result of subversion can be contemplated.

The key to the situation may lie in the people which compose this Committee, for in many instances it is not what you say, but who says it. We propose the following five people:

- 1) A Rebel Army officer who would not have to be of very high rank. He certainly could not belong to any group which already has created political interests as to the leaders they would sponsor in any solution, e.g. the Hubert Matos group; Reguado Frente del Escambray, who were always a small group and have hardly anybody left in Cuba; those who have been in contact with the Frente or Consejo; etc.
- 2) Manolo Rey -the only revolutionary of stature in exile-.
- 3) An officer of the Rebel Navy, with similar qualifications to those of the Army officer.
- 4) A responsible of Militias now in exile.
- 5) A person like Pepin Bosch, who might be in a favorable disposition to participate in this. This person of weight -apofitico for the Cuban mind- is important as a means of expressing that the enterprise has United States backing. At the same time, any solution against the Communists is

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Cuba means the eventual return to a free enterprise economy in one way or another. In this respect, a serious person with whom to negotiate the transition may be warranted by the same people that could overthrow Castro.

Either 3) or 4) could be represented as well by some revolutionary of the 26th of July.

Before embarking in this course of action, the U.S. Government must have a clear understanding that this policy would come under heavy attack from numerous quarters, specially from many of the Cuban exiles. It is also important to note that this policy can be undertaken independently of the Consejo Revolucionario and other exile organizations, which could continue as up to the present.

Because of the oppositions it will have, it might be a good idea if this new policy makes its appearance as an initiative of persons of prestige in Latin America, as Lleras Cervera, José Figueres, Romulo Betancourt, Gale Plaza, etc.

TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW

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In Cuba a real Revolution has taken place where a more dynamic group of people have displaced from [illeg] -in the broad sense of the world used in the Social Sciences- another group riddled by contradictions, who is now mostly residing in the United States. (I refer to the ex-leaders of Cuban society, rather than to the mass of people now in exile). The sad part of this affair is that Dr. Castro has taken the Cuban Revolution into the Communist camp against the desire of the majority of revolutionaries who have nevertheless followed him because never, during the last two years, has there been an alternative course open to them -or a large group of them- whereby they (the Revolution) could retain power after overthrowing Castro and the Communists.

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to point out that for a long time now it has been the conviction of many Rebel Army officers and Cuban Government officials that the sole interest of Russian in Cuba was to use their country as a bargaining card with the United States. One way of approaching these people is by telling them that there is [10 words illeg]

(d) [10 words illeg]

(e) The possibility of activating public opinion through [illeg] in [illeg] of an anti-Communist solution which may seem possible and [illeg] to them. Possibly because it would have the United States [2 word illeg] favorable because it would not mean the loss of the higher status which the Revolution had given them. The mobilization of public opinion around certain goals would, of course, have tremendous influence in the Armed forces, Militia and the Vigilance Committees.

Thus, because of the above mentioned factors, we think that it is possible to induce many of the persons now the Regime to [illeg] against it, if [2 words illeg] the appropriate circumstances and [illeg] are created.

These circumstances and atmosphere consist fundamentally of [illeg] Cuba, the certainty that any group of persons, regardless of [illeg] ground, that overthrow the Communist Regime can count with immediate United States recognition and economic help with no [illeg] attached.

To accomplish our goals we must organize at two different levels. Finally, the United States Government, through direct [illeg] that can be interpreted in that sense, must create the atmosphere that it would accept any internal solution against the Communists

in Cuba. In this respect we consider of the utmost importance that the O.A.S. should pass resolutions along these lines which would provide the guarantee that international organizations always give. Secondly, a group of Cubans in exile should operate as something on a bridge with these Cubans, now with the Regime, that could precipitate an internal solution of the sort we have been speaking about.

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